Lesson 20 — Microsoft Entra Identity Protection Policies
Microsoft Entra Identity Protection detects suspicious identity activity and assigns risk to sign-ins and users.
Those signals become operational controls when they are connected to Conditional Access. A risky sign-in can require multifactor authentication. A risky user can be required to complete a secure password change. Severe or unresolvable risk can be blocked and investigated.
This lesson explains sign-in risk, user risk, risk detections, remediation, policy design and the migration away from legacy Identity Protection policies before their retirement on October 1, 2026.

What you will learn
This lesson explains how Microsoft Entra risk detections trigger automated identity protection through Conditional Access.
Learning objectives
After completing this lesson, you should be able to design and investigate Microsoft Entra Identity Protection policies.
- Explain sign-in risk and user risk.
- Describe common risk detections.
- Build risk-based Conditional Access policies.
- Require MFA for risky sign-ins.
- Require secure password change for risky users.
- Plan policy exclusions and emergency access.
- Investigate and remediate identity risk.
The problem this solves
A correct password does not prove that the genuine user is signing in.
Credentials may be stolen, leaked, sprayed, replayed or used from infrastructure associated with malicious activity.
What is Microsoft Entra Identity Protection?
Microsoft Entra Identity Protection detects, investigates and helps remediate identity-based risk.
Sign-in risk
Sign-in risk represents the probability that a specific authentication request was not performed by the legitimate identity owner.
It applies to one sign-in event and can change as Microsoft receives more evidence.
User risk
User risk represents the probability that the identity itself has been compromised.
It considers unresolved detections and suspicious activity associated with the account over time.
Sign-in risk vs user risk
| Risk type | Question being answered | Typical policy response |
|---|---|---|
| Sign-in risk | Is this authentication request likely to be unauthorised? | Require MFA or block the sign-in. |
| User risk | Is this identity likely to be compromised? | Require secure password change or block access. |
Risk levels
Risk is commonly classified as low, medium or high.
Policy design should match the confidence and impact of the detected activity rather than treating every signal identically.
Risk state
A detection can remain at risk, become remediated, be dismissed, be confirmed compromised or be confirmed safe.
The state records what happened after the original detection.
Examples of risk detections
| Detection | What it may indicate | Investigation focus |
|---|---|---|
| Atypical travel | Sign-ins occurred from distant locations in an unusual timeframe. | Device, IP address, travel history and session continuity. |
| Anonymous IP address | The sign-in used Tor, VPN or anonymising infrastructure. | Whether the service is legitimate or attacker-controlled. |
| Unfamiliar sign-in properties | The device, browser, location or network differs from normal behaviour. | Compare with the user’s established sign-in pattern. |
| Leaked credentials | Microsoft has identified credentials associated with exposure. | Immediate password reset, session revocation and impact review. |
| Malicious IP address | The source has known malicious reputation or observed attack activity. | Cross-user attempts and successful access. |
| Password spray | A common password is attempted across many accounts. | Source infrastructure, targeted users and successful sign-ins. |
Real-time detections
Some risk detections are evaluated during the sign-in process.
Conditional Access can respond immediately before access is granted.
Offline detections
Other detections require additional processing and appear after the sign-in has completed.
These may raise user risk and require investigation or later remediation.
Modern risk-policy architecture
Legacy policy retirement
The legacy user-risk and sign-in-risk policies configured directly in Identity Protection retire on October 1, 2026.
Organisations should migrate these controls to Conditional Access.
Why Conditional Access?
Conditional Access provides broader scoping, exclusions, report-only deployment, authentication strengths, session controls and consistent policy management.
It is the modern enforcement path for Identity Protection signals.
Policy 1 — Require MFA for risky sign-ins
Why require MFA?
A stolen password may satisfy the first authentication factor.
Requiring MFA gives the legitimate user an opportunity to prove possession of an additional registered method.
When to block
Blocking may be appropriate when risk is high, remediation is unavailable or the account is too sensitive to permit self-service access.
Blocking should be paired with a clear investigation and recovery process.
Policy 2 — Require remediation for risky users
Secure password change
Self-service remediation requires the user to complete MFA before changing the compromised password.
This prevents an attacker who only knows the password from replacing it with another attacker-controlled value.
Prerequisites
Users need appropriate licensing, registered authentication methods and Self-Service Password Reset capability.
Hybrid users also require correctly configured password writeback when the password must be changed in Active Directory.
Emergency access accounts
Emergency access accounts should be excluded from user-based Conditional Access policies to avoid complete administrative lockout.
Their sign-ins must be separately protected, monitored and alerted.
Service accounts
Traditional user-based risk remediation may not suit noninteractive service accounts.
Move workloads toward managed identities or service principals and apply workload-specific controls.
Safe deployment process
Report-only mode
Report-only mode shows how the policy would evaluate without enforcing its grant controls.
Use sign-in logs and Conditional Access results to detect unexpected scope or access impact.
Impact analysis
The risk-based access policy impact workbook helps estimate which users and sign-ins would be challenged, remediated or blocked.
This is valuable before broad enforcement.
Remediation outcomes
| Outcome | Meaning | Use |
|---|---|---|
| Self-remediated | The user successfully completed the required secure action. | Risk can be cleared automatically. |
| Admin confirmed safe | Investigation determined the activity was legitimate. | Close a false positive with evidence. |
| Admin confirmed compromised | Investigation confirmed attacker activity. | Trigger containment, reset and impact review. |
| Risk dismissed | An administrator manually closed the risk. | Use cautiously and document the reason. |
| User blocked | Access is prevented pending investigation. | Contain severe or unresolved identity risk. |
Agent Foskett investigation: “The user completed MFA, but the account is still risky”
Compromise indicators
- Successful access from malicious infrastructure.
- Leaked credentials detection.
- New MFA methods registered unexpectedly.
- Inbox rules, OAuth consent or privilege changes follow the sign-in.
- Multiple users are targeted from the same source.
- The user denies the activity.
False-positive indicators
- The user confirms travel or VPN usage.
- The device and session are known and managed.
- No suspicious post-authentication activity occurred.
- The source belongs to an approved corporate service.
- The detection is explained by a documented network change.
- Authentication and endpoint evidence agree.
Real-world scenario: MFA stopped the password attacker
Common mistakes
| Mistake | Impact | Better practice |
|---|---|---|
| Leaving legacy risk policies in place | Controls face retirement and fragmented management. | Migrate to Conditional Access before October 1, 2026. |
| Enabling broad blocking immediately | Legitimate users may be locked out. | Use Report-only mode and staged deployment. |
| Ignoring MFA and SSPR readiness | Users cannot self-remediate safely. | Complete registration before enforcement. |
| Excluding too many users | High-risk identities remain unprotected. | Keep exclusions minimal and documented. |
| Dismissing risk without investigation | Compromise evidence may be erased operationally. | Correlate sign-ins, devices and post-authentication activity. |
| Treating MFA success as proof of safety | Token theft or compromised methods may be missed. | Review the full identity timeline. |
Key takeaways
- Sign-in risk measures the likelihood that one authentication request is unauthorised.
- User risk measures the likelihood that the identity is compromised.
- Identity Protection risk signals should be enforced through Conditional Access.
- Medium or high sign-in risk can require MFA.
- High user risk can require secure password change.
- Legacy Identity Protection risk policies retire on October 1, 2026.
- Report-only mode, impact analysis and staged deployment reduce operational risk.
- MFA, SSPR and password writeback readiness are essential for self-remediation.
- Risk should be investigated using sign-in, endpoint, application and post-authentication evidence.
Related Agent Foskett resources
Continue learning
Microsoft Entra Identity Protection Risk Policies and Conditional Access
Microsoft Entra Identity Protection detects risky users and risky sign-ins, then supplies those signals to Conditional Access for multifactor authentication, secure password change, blocking and automated remediation.
Microsoft Entra Academy Lesson 20 — Identity Protection Policies
This Agent Foskett lesson explains user risk, sign-in risk, risk detections, Conditional Access design, MFA challenges, secure password remediation, investigation workflows and migration from legacy Identity Protection policies before October 1, 2026.
