Lesson 6 — The Alert Had Five Entities — Which One Do You Pivot On?
The alert looks busy. It contains a user, a device, an IP address, a process and a file.
Every one of them could lead somewhere useful.
The question is not whether you can pivot on an entity. The question is which pivot will
reduce uncertainty fastest and move the investigation forward.
Five possible pivots
The alert contains a user, device, IP address, PowerShell process and downloaded file. You need to decide which entity gives you the strongest next step.
Case briefing
Investigation objective
Learn how to choose between multiple alert entities by asking which one is most likely to explain the activity, expose related evidence and create reliable pivots for the next stage of the investigation.
Investigator's rule
Pivot with a purpose. Do not click through every entity simply because it is available. Know what question you are trying to answer before choosing where to go next.
Stage 1 — understand what each entity can tell you
| Entity | What it can reveal | Typical limitation |
|---|---|---|
| User | Sign-ins, identity risk, privilege, cloud activity, other devices. | Account context does not prove human attribution. |
| Device | Processes, files, network activity, alerts, other logged-on users. | A busy device can produce a lot of unrelated telemetry. |
| IP address | Other sign-ins, connections, reputation and recurrence. | Shared infrastructure and NAT can weaken attribution. |
| Process | Parent/child relationships, command lines, file and network activity. | Requires good process telemetry and context. |
| File | Hash, origin, prevalence, execution and affected devices. | A file may be renamed, copied or never executed. |
Entities answer different questions
If you need to know whether the account was compromised, the user may be the best pivot. If you need to explain execution, the process or device may be better. The same alert can therefore have different correct pivots depending on the question.
Not every entity is equally strong
An external IP may look interesting, but if it belongs to a common cloud provider it may tell you less than the process that actually made the connection.
Stage 2 — start with the process when the alert is about execution
This alert is fundamentally about script execution. The process is therefore a strong first pivot because it can reveal how the activity started and what happened next.
let TargetDevice = "FIN-LT-044";
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where DeviceName =~ TargetDevice
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| project Timestamp,
DeviceName,
AccountName,
FileName,
ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
ProcessId,
InitiatingProcessId,
SHA1
| order by Timestamp asc
Parent process is often decisive
If PowerShell was launched by outlook.exe, winword.exe or a browser, that creates a very different investigation path from PowerShell launched by an approved management agent.
Command line creates more pivots
A URL, file path, encoded command, script name or remote host in the command line can immediately expose the next entity worth investigating.
Stage 3 — pivot from process to network evidence
Once the process is understood, use it to examine outbound communication from the same device and time window.
let TargetDevice = "FIN-LT-044";
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where DeviceName =~ TargetDevice
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| project Timestamp,
DeviceName,
InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
RemoteIP,
RemotePort,
RemoteUrl,
Protocol
| order by Timestamp asc
Now the IP has context
The external IP becomes more valuable once you know which process contacted it. Instead of asking whether the IP is “bad,” you can ask why PowerShell on FIN-LT-044 communicated with it.
Context before reputation
Threat intelligence can help, but reputation is not a substitute for behaviour. A previously unseen destination contacted by suspicious PowerShell activity can matter even if no reputation service has labelled it malicious.
Stage 4 — pivot to the user when identity becomes the question
If the process activity appears suspicious, determine whether the same user showed unusual authentication or activity around the same time.
let TargetUser = "alex.w@contoso.com";
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ TargetUser
| project TimeGenerated,
UserPrincipalName,
IPAddress,
Location,
AppDisplayName,
DeviceDetail,
AuthenticationRequirement,
ConditionalAccessStatus,
ResultType
| order by TimeGenerated asc
The user can widen the incident
A user pivot may reveal additional devices, cloud activity, risky sign-ins or sessions that were not visible in the original endpoint alert.
Do not pivot forever
Every entity can lead to more entities. Stop expanding when the new pivot no longer helps answer the investigation question or meaningfully changes scope, confidence or response.
Stage 5 — choose pivots in an evidence chain
Which entity should you pivot on?
| Your question | Best first pivot | Why |
|---|---|---|
| How did the suspicious execution start? | Process | Exposes parent process, command line and execution context. |
| What else happened on the affected endpoint? | Device | Provides process, file, network and alert history. |
| Was the account compromised? | User | Opens sign-in, session and cloud activity context. |
| Did the suspicious process communicate externally? | Process / device | Connects execution directly to network evidence. |
| Where else did this file appear? | File hash | Helps identify prevalence across devices. |
| Did this infrastructure touch other accounts? | IP address | Can reveal broader identity or network scope when interpreted carefully. |
Write the pivot decision like an analyst
Example: The alert contained five primary entities: user alex.w@contoso.com, device FIN-LT-044, source/destination IP context, powershell.exe and invoice-update.ps1. Because the alert was triggered by suspicious script execution, the initial pivot focused on the PowerShell process to establish parent process, command-line and execution context. That pivot identified related outbound network activity, after which the external destination and user identity were examined to determine wider incident scope. Entity pivots were selected according to the investigation question rather than explored independently.
Lesson 6 key takeaways
- Every alert entity is a possible pivot, but not every pivot is equally useful.
- Choose the entity most likely to answer the next investigation question.
- Process is often the strongest first pivot for execution-based alerts.
- Parent process and command-line evidence can reveal new entities immediately.
- Network indicators become more meaningful when tied to an initiating process.
- User pivots help connect endpoint activity with identity and cloud evidence.
- Device pivots are useful for reconstructing a wider local timeline.
- File hashes can help establish prevalence across multiple devices.
- IP addresses require context because NAT, proxies and shared services can weaken attribution.
- Stop pivoting when new entities no longer reduce uncertainty or change the investigation.
Module 1 — inside the SOC
You now know how to choose the most useful entity for the next investigation step. The next question is knowing when you have gathered enough evidence to make a decision.
Continue your SOC Analyst training
🔎 SOC Analyst Academy — Module 1: Inside the SOC: Thinking Like an Analyst
How SOC analysts choose an investigation pivot
Lesson 6 of the Agent Foskett SOC Analyst Academy teaches analysts how to choose between users, devices, IP addresses, processes and files when deciding the next step in a security investigation.
Entity pivoting with Microsoft Defender XDR, Entra and KQL
Learn how to follow process, network and identity evidence using targeted KQL queries and select pivots according to the question the investigation needs to answer.
